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Introduction 
The Mangold1 case is the first to bring before the ECJ the provisions of Council Directive 
2000/78/CE, of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation2 (hereafter ‘ The Directive’). The Court is called upon to enquire 
on the very nature of its Article 6, devoted to the justification of differences of treatment on 
grounds of age and motivated by the new Member States’ concern for “supporting older 
workers, in order to increase their participation in the labour force”3. The case for litigation 
therefore constitutes the first interface between the Community judiciary, the Community 
legislature, the Member States and EU citizens on questions raised by modern employment 
policies as expressed in the European Employment Strategy (hereafter ‘The EES’). It is in 
this context that the Court, gathered in a Grand Chamber, grants Directive 2000/78 and the 
new general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age an unprecedented effect.4 
Indeed, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age derived from EC law is applied 
between two private parties suspected of having manufactured the litigation and this, even 
before the end of the implementation period of the Directive on age discrimination. The 
Mangold case therefore raises two burning questions for the Community legal order. It first 
questions the law on the effect of directives and general principles of Community law in the 
legal order of the Member States. It secondly, brings under the scrutiny of the EC judiciary, in 
the framework of Article 234 EC, new tools of employment policy in the Member States.  
Before analysing both aspects of the impact of the case, we ought briefly to recall its facts 
and the ruling of the Court. 
 
                                                          
* Academic assistant in the Law Department of  the College of Europe, Bruges and PhD student at Queen Mary 
University, London. I am very grateful to D. Hanf, V. Hatzopoulos, C. Kilpatrick and T.  Tridimas for useful comments 
on previous drafts and in particular to Claire Kilpatrick for very helpful discussions on this case on her various visits to 
Bruges. The usual disclaimer of course applies. This article is an extended version of a short case note in (2006) 2 
Revue de Droit de l’Union Européenne forthcoming. 
1 C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 22 November 2005, nyr. 
2 [2000] O.J. L 303/16. 
3 Recital 8, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
4 The case has accordingly been promptly noticed as can be seen from the Editorial, “Out with the old…” (2006) 31 
E.L.Rev. 1. 
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Factual and legal background 
The litigation arose between Mr. Mangold and his employer, Mr. Helm, regarding the 
possibility to conclude fixed-term employment contracts under flexible conditions with aged 
workers. Mr Mangold concluded a contract of employment with Mr Helm on 26 June 2003 
that was to take effect between 1 July 2003 and 28 February 2004. At the time of signing the 
contract, Mr Mangold was 56 years old, the contract was therefore of limited duration by 
direct and exclusive reference5 to Paragraph 14(3) of the German law on part-time working 
and fixed-term contracts, the ‘TzBfG’6 that reads as follows: “A fixed-term employment 
contract shall not require objective justification if when starting the fixed-term employment 
relationship the employee has reached the age of 58.” The same provision adds “[u]ntil 31 
 December 2006 the first sentence shall be read as referring to the age of 52 instead of 58” 
(hereafter ‘transitory regime’). Mr Mangold subsequently claimed the incompatibility of 
Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG with, on the one hand, the Framework Agreement on fixed-
term contracts concluded between the European social partners (‘the Framework 
Agreement’) and put into effect by Directive 1999/707 and, on the other hand, Directive 
2000/78. Both instruments were submitted to a question of interpretation to the ECJ in the 
given case. 
A first point relates to the compatibility of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG with the Framework 
Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70.8 The TzBfG indeed constitutes the implementation 
measure in German law of the Framework Agreement.  Clause 8(3) of the latter states that 
“[i]mplementation of this agreement shall not constitute valid grounds for reducing the general 
level of protection afforded to workers in the field of the agreement.” The question that 
therefore arises relates to the compatibility with this non-regression clause of the reduction, 
resulting from the TzBfG, of the age above which a fixed-term contract of employment may 
be concluded without restrictions. Prior to  the adoption of the TzBfG, the age limit was 
indeed 60 years. This was brought down to 58 by the initial version the TzBfG, before the 
transitory regime based on the age limit of 52 and applicable to Mr Mangold was introduced.9   
A second series of questions relates to the substance and effects of Directive 2000/78 which 
lays down a general framework for combating, among others, discrimination on grounds of 
                                                          
5 Art. 5(2) and 5(3) of the contract of employment. 
6 Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge und zur Änderung und Aufhebung arbeitsrechtlicher 
Bestimmungen. 
7 Framework Agreement concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP on 18 March 1999  and put into effect by Council 
Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, [1999] O.J. L 175/43. 
8 A second subquestion, related to Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, is immediately set aside by the ECJ 
observing that it is irrelevant to the litigation. 
9 It is only in a subsequent amendment of the TzBfG, by the First Law for the provision of modern services on the 
labour market of 23 December 2002, that the age limit of 58 years was temporarily replaced by a limit of 52 years. In 
the given case, the referring court seeks an interpretation of Clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement in order to 
assess the validity of Paragraph 14(3) of theTzBfG in its original version. The Arbeitsgericht München considers that 
should Paragraph 14(3) of theTzBfG in its original version not comply with Community law, its 2002 amendment, 
applicable in the dispute, would be invalid. 
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age as regards employment and occupation.10 Article 6(1) of the Directive, devoted to the 
justification of differences of treatment on grounds of age, states that: “Member States may 
provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, 
within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate 
aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, 
and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.” It then lists a few 
examples of justified differences of treatment such as setting special conditions of access to 
employment and vocational training, employment and occupation of older workers in order to 
promote their vocational integration.11 The Arbeitsgericht München asks whether Article 6(1) 
of the Directive must be interpreted as precluding a provision such as Paragraph 14(3) of the 
TzBfG that authorises, under very flexible conditions, the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of 
employment once the worker has reached the age of 52. If, indeed, such a measure is held to 
be discriminatory, the national jurisdiction further asks whether it should “refuse to apply the 
provision of domestic law which is contrary to Community law and apply the general principle 
of internal law, under which fixed terms of employment are permissible only if they are 
justified on objective grounds’”12. The reason behind such a question is twofold. First, at the 
time of the facts, the Federal Republic of Germany benefited from an exceptional additional 
implementation period, provided for by the Directive itself to take into account particular 
conditions in certain Member States. 13  These extra three years starting as from 2 December 
2003 resulted in the precise nature of the obligation derived from the Directive being unclear. 
Second, it is commonly understood that Community directives cannot have horizontal direct 
effect. 
 
The judgement of the Court 
The Federal Republic of Germany first challenges the admissibility of the reference for a 
preliminary ruling by arguing that the very nature of the dispute is “fictitious or contrived”14. 
Indeed, prior to the litigation under scrutiny, Mr Helm had publicly argued for the unlawfulness 
of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG in identical circumstances. The Court meets this point by 
stressing that “it hardly seems arguable that the interpretation of Community law sought by 
the national court does actually respond to an objective need inherent in the outcome of a 
case pending before it”15 since the contract was performed and its application does require 
the interpretation of Community law. Moreover, the agreement of the parties as to the correct 
                                                          
10 Art. 1, Directive 2000/78. 
11 Art. 6(1), second Paragraph, Subparagraphs (a) (b) and (c), Directive 2000/78. 
12 At [31]. 
13 Such a procedure was provided for in Art. 18, second Paragraph, Directive 2000/78. 
14 At [32]. 
15 At [38]. 
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interpretation of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG does not affect the reality of the dispute.16 The 
order for reference is therefore admissible. 
The Court first scrutinizes the initial version of Paragraph 14(3) of theTzBfG with the non-
regression requirement contained in Clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement. It recalls that 
the non-regression clause only applies in the “sphere covered by that agreement”17. It is 
clear18 nevertheless that the “the successive reductions of the age above which the 
conclusion of a fixed-term contract is permissible without restrictions are justified, not by the 
need to put the Framework Agreement into effect but by the need to encourage the 
employment of older persons in Germany.”19 It follows that lowering down the age above 
which fixed-term contracts of employment may be concluded without restrictions in the TzBfG 
is not contrary to Clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement.  
The Court therefore focuses on the questions related on the one hand to the substance of 
Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, and on the other hand to its effect in national law. By 
allowing employers to conclude without restriction fixed-term contracts of employment with 
workers over the age of 52, Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG clearly constitutes a direct 
discrimination on ground of age contravening the prohibition set out in Article 1 of the 
Directive. Article 6(1) of this Directive nonetheless allows for differences of treatment on 
grounds of age when objectively and reasonably justified, within the context of national law, 
by a legitimate aim. According to the Court, Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG, unquestionably 
pursues such an aim, since it seeks to promote the vocational integration of unemployed 
older workers to take into account their particular difficulties in finding work.20 Moreover, the 
Court recalls that for the purpose of employment and social policy choices, Member States 
enjoy broad discretion.21 The national measure under scrutiny however is not appropriate and 
necessary. The wording of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG leads to the lawfulness of any fixed-
term contract of employment and indefinite renewal of such contracts with workers above 52 
irrespective of their prior status as employed or unemployed and its length. It follows that 
Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG goes beyond what is necessary for the promotion of the 
vocational integration of unemployed older workers and cannot be justified on the basis of 
Article 6(1) of the Directive. 
This conclusion, explains the Court, is not called into question by the fact that the 
employment contract was concluded before the end of the transposition period of the 
Directive, for two reasons.  
                                                          
16 At [38]. 
17 At [50]. 
18 A.G. Tizzano in Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, Opinion of 30 June 2005, [75]-[77]. 
19 At [53]. 
20 At [59]. 
21 At [63]. 
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First of all, even before the end of the implementation period and according to the Inter-
Environnement Wallonie case-law, national authorities must refrain from taking any measures 
liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that Directive 
irrespective of whether this national measure is concerned with its implementation or not.22 
The fact that the national provision at stake expires only a few days after the end of the 
implementation is not in itself decisive. On the one hand, Member States granted an 
exceptional extension of the implementation period have a duty to progressively approximate 
their legislation with the objectives of the Directive.23 On the other hand, a significant 
proportion of workers will have reached the age of 58 by the end of the transitory regime and 
will therefore be liable to definite exclusion from stable employment.24 
Second and “above all”25, stresses the Court, “…[…]in accordance with Article 1 [of Directive 
2000/78], the sole purpose of the Directive is ‘to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”26. The 
source of the principle, as can be seen from the Preamble of the Directive27, lies in various 
international instruments and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.28  
Non-discrimination on grounds of age therefore constitutes a general principle of Community 
Law29 that should be applied to measures falling within the scope of Community Law 
irrespective of the implementation period of the Directive. 30  
As an instrument of implementation of the Framework Agreement, Paragraph 14(3) of the 
TzBfG falls within the scope of EC law and has been found to be discriminatory within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78. It is the responsibility of national courts, by 
application of the Simmenthal doctrine31, to ensure the full effectiveness of the general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. This implies the national jurisdiction’s duty 
to set aside the national provision.32  
 
Assessment 
As can be seen from the above account of the facts and reasoning of the Court, the ruling in 
Mangold in somewhat surprising, if not puzzling. Answering an order for reference raised in a 
                                                          
22 At [67]-[68]. 
23 At [72]. 
24 At [73]. 
25 At [74]. 
26 At [74]. 
27 Recitals 3 and 4, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
28 At [74]. 
29 At [75]. 
30 At [76]. 
31 Case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] E.C.R. 629. 
32 At [78]. 
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litigation that can be suspected of having been manufactured,  the Court explores 
unprecedented mechanisms to give full effect to a general principle of law encompassed in a 
new framework directive therefore asserting its human rights jurisdiction over modern 
national employment policies.    
 
Enhancing the effects of EC law in national law?   
At first, one may be surprised to see a litigation between private parties initiated before the 
end of the implementation period of a directive, being solved on the basis of a right initially 
contained in this directive. The Court makes a manipulative use of the case-law related to the 
legal effects of directives (a) by relying upon the general principle of Community law fleshed 
out in the Directive. This novel solution allows the Court to rule that conflicting national 
provisions ought to be set aside (b).  
 
(a) The manipulative use of the law related to the legal effects of directives  
 
If it is established that an adequately transposed directive takes effect through the medium of 
national implementing measures33, the very nature of directive as set out in Article 249 
Paragraph 3 EC raises two practical questions illustrated by the litigation between Mr 
Mangold and Mr Helm.  
 
(i) The question of the effects of directives before the end of the implementation period goes 
unanswered 
The existence of Member States duties before the end of the transposition period was laid 
down in the Inter-Environnement Wallonie case34 where the Court stated that “the obligation 
of a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a 
directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article [249] of the Treaty 
and by the directive itself”35 from the date of its notification onwards36. The precise nature of 
the duties incumbent upon the Member State from the publication of a directive until the 
expiry of the implementation period was unclear and the Court admitted that “[s]ince the 
purpose of such a period is, in particular, to give Member States the necessary time to adopt 
transposition measures, they cannot be faulted for not having transposed the directive into 
their internal legal order before expiry of that period”37. It asserted however that “[a]lthough 
the Member States are not obliged to adopt those measures before the end of the period 
                                                          
33 Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] E.C.R. 53, [19]. 
34 Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne [1997] E.C.R. I-7411. 
35 ibid., [40]. 
36 ibid., [41]. 
37 ibid., [43]. 
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prescribed for transposition, it follows from the second paragraph of Article [10] in conjunction 
with the third paragraph of Article [249] of the Treaty and from the directive itself that during 
that period they must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the 
result prescribed.”38 
  
The exact scope of this statement remains, ten years after the ruling, most unclear on three 
accounts, which are highly relevant for our analysis of the Mangold dispute.  
The first element of uncertainty relates to the difficulty of identifying “measures liable 
seriously to compromise the result prescribed” by the directive. This task was left to the 
national court in Inter-Environnement Wallonie39 but subsequent case-law established that 
the national measures to be scrutinised included not only implementation measures of the 
directive at stake but also all other measures adopted after the publication of the directive.40 
No guidelines however existed prior to Mangold on the assessment of how seriously a 
national measure had to be liable to compromise the results prescribed by the directive in 
order for it to be contrary to EC law. Implicitly tackling this issue in the present ruling, the 
Court rejects the argument that the national provision under scrutiny will expire a few weeks 
after the end of the implementation period of the Directive.41 It rather focuses on the one 
hand, on the specific duty of the Federal Republic of Germany during the additional period for 
implementation, namely to progressively take concrete measures and to report to the 
Commission.42 On the second hand, the Court analyses the practical effect that the national 
provision at stake would have on a significant proportion of the workers who would have 
reached the age of 58 by the end of the transitory regime. This class of workers would indeed 
be in danger of becoming definitively excluded from the safeguard of stable employment 
resulting from the use of fixed-term contracts. It therefore implicitly follows that the national 
provision at stake seriously compromises the result prescribed by the Directive. The practical 
consequences to be derived from this observation are nevertheless most unclear as we shall 
now see. 
A second question indeed raised by the Inter-Environnement Wallonie statement relates to 
the precise legal nature of the duty incumbent upon the Member State. If the Member States 
are to refrain from taking any measures liable to seriously compromise the result prescribed 
by the Directive during its implementation period, what should the legal and practical 
consequence of a breach of this duty be? It has been argued that the national authorities 
would have a duty of consistent interpretation of national provisions even before the end of 
the implementation period. 43 This option leaves the problem of an express incompatibility 
between a positive act adopted at national level and Community law unsolved. Setting aside 
                                                          
38 ibid., [45]. 
39 ibid., [46]. 
40 Case C-14/02, ATRAL SA and Etat Belge [2003] E.C.R. I-4431, [58]-[59]. 
41 At [70]. 
42 At [71]-[72]. 
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the national provision at stake would contravene the Court’s point in Ratti that “it is only at the 
end of the prescribed period that the directive […] will be able to have [direct effect].”44 One 
could question the possibility of claiming damages against the State but this would raise the 
question of the relationship between the requirements of a measure liable seriously to 
compromise the result prescribed by the directive and the existence of a serious breach of 
Community law. At last, it seems unlikely that an enforcement action could be initiated before 
the expiry of the implementation period. The case at hand circumvents these issues by 
referring to the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as formulated in 
Directive 2000/78. The question of the practical impact of Inter-Environnement Wallonie is 
therefore left unanswered.45 
Thirdly, if the nature of the negative duty imposed upon the Member States in Inter-
Environnement Wallonie is most controversial, one would have expected the Court, a fortiori, 
to tackle with great caution the question of the effects of Directives upon individuals before 
the expiry of the implementation period. Indeed, even if some of the above mechanisms were 
identified as being operational before the end of the implementation period, the Court would 
have to clarify the extent to which it could result in imposing obligations on private parties. 
This point, far from being specific to the period preceding the expiry of the deadline for 
implementation shall now be discussed further.  
  
(ii) Disregarding the law on the horizontal effect of directives 
Leaving aside the case-law recognising the possibility for directives to have direct effect in 
litigation between an individual and the State46, an informed analysis of the Mangold ruling 
requires a short overview of the case-law on the effect of directives between private parties.  
In Faccini Dori47, the Court was faced with the question of “whether, in the absence of 
measures transposing the directive within the prescribed time-limit, consumers may derive 
from the directive itself a right of cancellation against traders with whom they have concluded 
contracts and enforce that right before a national court”48. The Court distinguished this 
situation from the possibility for an individual to rely on the provisions of a directive against 
the State and pointed out that “The effect of extending that case-law to the sphere of relations 
between individuals would be to recognize a power in the Community to enact obligations for 
individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence to do so only where it is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
43 See for instance A.G. Jacobs in Case C-156/91,  Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt GmbH & Co. KG v Landrat des 
Kreises Schleswig-Flensburg., Opinion of 25 June 1992 , [18]-[27] and in Case C-212/91, Angelopharm GmbH v 
Freie Hansestadt Hamburg, Opinion of 16 June 1993, [70]-[76].   
44 Case 148/78, Ratti [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [43]. 
45 See, along similar lines, Lenaerts and Corthaut, « Of birds and hedges : the role of primacy in onvoking norms of 
EU law » (2006) 31 E.L.Rev. 287, 293. 
46 Directives may give rise to rights in favour of individuals against the State see e.g. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v the 
Home Office [1974] E.C.R. 1337. But the State may not avail itself of the provisions of a Directive that has not 
(correctly) been transposed, see e.g. Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, Berlusconi et al. [2005] 
E.C.R. I-3565.    
47 Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] E.C.R. I-3325. 
48 ibid., [19]. 
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empowered to adopt regulations.”49 It therefore followed from the distinction between 
directives and regulations that “in the absence of measures transposing the directive within 
the prescribed time-limit, consumers cannot derive from the directive itself a right of 
cancellation as against traders with whom they have concluded a contract or enforce such a 
right in a national court.”50 This constitutes authority for the well known assertion that 
directives do not have horizontal direct effect.51  
In practice, however, the dividing line between the absence of horizontal direct effect of 
directives and the possibility that a directive may have an incidental effect upon the situations 
of individuals has pushed the Court to sharpen its case-law.52 As the Court itself puts it, 
directives that “define the substantive scope of the legal rule on the basis of which the 
national court must decide the case before it”53 must be distinguished from directive that 
“[create] neither rights nor obligations for individuals”54. The latter type of directives, merely 
concerned with public law duties of the Member States could have incidental effect on the 
situation of individuals.55  
 
A first line of case-law involves disputes between an individual and the State the outcome of 
which may have an impact on third parties to the dispute.56  A second and more controversial 
line of cases is particularly interesting for a closer analysis of the facts in Mangold. It covers 
disputes between private parties, as arose in CIA57 and Unilever58, where the provisions of 
Directive 83/18959 are incidentally relied upon, in order to render a provision of national law 
inapplicable.  In both cases, the ECJ ruled that the national jurisdiction was to disapply the 
national provision in breach of the procedural requirements of Article 8 (notification of a new 
national measure) and Article 9 (postponement of the adoption of new national measures) of 
                                                          
49 ibid., [24]. 
50 ibid., [25].  
51 Note that it ought to be read in conjunction with an extensive interpretation of the notion of State, allowing the 
recognition of direct effect in a broad range of relationships between individuals and the State (e.g. Case C-188/89, 
Foster v British Gas [1990] E.C.R. I-3313), and with national authorities’ far reaching duty of conform interpretation of 
national law at the light of Community law (e.g. Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al. [2004] 
E.C.R. I-8835).  On the importance of looking at these various mechanisms together see Lenaerts and Corthaut, 
supra fn.45. 
52 See e.g. Tridimas, « Black White and Shades of Grey: Horizontality of Directives Revisited” (2002) 21 Yearbook of 
European Law 327, p. 327 and Editorial, « Horizontal direct effect – A law of diminishing coherence ? » (2006) 43 
Common  Market Law Review 1, 2. 
53 Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia SpA v Central Food SpA [2000] E.C.R. I-7535, [51]. 
54 ibid., [51].  
55 See e.g. the distinction between directives “that specifically require Member States to modify the nexus of rights 
and duties arising under private law relationships” and directives that “organize relations either between Member 
States and the Community or between Member States and individuals” in Editorial, Common  Market Law Review, 
supra fn.52, 2. 
56 In litigation of that kind, the directive is relied upon for the annulment of an administrative act. The annulment of 
such an act, resulting from the vertical direct effect of the directive is likely to affect third parties incidentally 
concerned with that act. See in particular A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer, 
Opinion of 24 April 2004, [41]. Examples can be found in the case-law on environmental assessments, see e.g. Case 
C-435/97, World Wildlife Fund and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen [1999] E.C.R. I-5613. 
57 Case C-194/94, CIA Security International v Signalson SA [1996] E.C.R. I-2201, [32]-[55]. 
58 Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, supra fn. 53, [31]-[52]. For a severe criticism of this case see Tridimas, « Black 
White and Shades of Grey […] », supra fn.52, 345. 
59 Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field 
of technical standards and regulations, [1983] O.J. L 109/8. 
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the Technical Standards Directive.60 The national authorities’ failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements of Directive 83/189 therefore led to the impossibility for a competitor 
in CIA and for the buyer in Unilever to rely on a provision of national law to escape other 
national law duties. If these rulings imply that a directive has legal consequences on the 
situations of individuals, the underlying rationale is that the directive imposes requirements of 
a public law nature on national authorities. From a theoretical point of view, this cannot be 
equated to applying the substantive provisions of a directive as it was attempted and failed in 
Faccini Dori.61  
It is in the light of this complex case-law that the dispute between Mr Mangold and Mr Helm 
shall be analysed. One could be tempted, as the Commission suggested, to draw a parallel 
with the CIA and Unilever cases. Mr Mangold is indeed seeking to rely on Directive 2000/78 
for the purpose of obtaining the inapplicability of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG and benefiting 
instead of a general principle of internal law, under which fixed terms of employment are 
permissible only if they are justified on objective grounds. By applying coherently the previous 
case-law and assuming that its underlying logic is the theoretical distinction between 
directives concerned with individual’s substantive rights and directives involving public law 
duties, such an analysis should be rejected.62 The claim of Mr Mangold is directly based on 
the substance of a directive granting specific rights to individuals, in contrast to the situations 
in CIA and Unilever where national law was challenged incidentally and on procedural 
grounds on the basis of the Technical Standards Directive. This view is in line with the 
Pfeiffer63 case in which the effect sought was similar to the one under discussion in Mangold 
and where the Court reiterated that the provisions of a directive conferring rights or imposing 
obligations on individuals cannot in itself apply between private parties.64 
  
In the light of previous case-law on the horizontal effect of directives the Mangold case 
should therefore have led the Court to recall its case-law on the lack of horizontal effect of 
directives. The Court however neither relies upon, nor distinguishes, nor expressly overrules 
this case-law. Instead, it merely disregards the horizontal nature of the dispute and focuses 
on the fact that the contract was concluded before the end of the implementation period. In 
that respect, the Court opts for a novel approach and circumvents the difficulties raised by the 
Inter-Environnement Wallonie case-law described supra by referring, “above all”65, to the 
general principle of non-discrimination as formulated in the Directive.  
                                                          
60 Case C-194/94, CIA, supra fn.57, [55], and Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia, supra fn. 53, [52]. 
61 In support of this  view, see Editorial, Common Market Law Review, supra fn.52,  3, and Tridimas, « Black White 
and Shades of Grey […] », supra fn.52, 340. For further discussion see in particular Lenaerts and Corthaut, supra 
fn.45, 305. 
62 See A.G. Tizzano,  supra fn.18, [107] and footnote 34. Please note that a very valuable discussion on direct effect 
and primacy, suggesting a new theoretical framework for the analysis of the case-law discussed above can be read 
in the present review, Lenaerts and Corthaut, supra fn.45. 
63 Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al., supra fn.51. 
64 Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al., supra fn.51, [109]. See case note by Prechal (2005) 
42 Common Market Law Review 1445.  
65 At [74]. 
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(b) The unprecedented effect of a new general principle of Community law  
 
According to the Court, Framework Directive 2000/78 constituted a mere ‘formalisation’ of the 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. The solution adopted by the Court 
is therefore not only surprising in that it does not fit with the previous case-law on the legal 
effects of directives but the approach suggested based on the general principle of Community 
law is also puzzling.     
 
(i) Uncertainties as regards the sources of the general principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age 
The ruling in Mangold makes it clear that Directive 2000/78 merely lays down a general 
framework for the principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation. Reliance on 
the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age allows the Court to circumvent 
the difficulties raised by the law on the effect of directive.  Two difficulties arise from this 
reasoning. 
Taking on board that general principles of Community law may derive from the creative and 
progressive approach of the Court rather than from a systematic analysis of the laws in each 
Member State66, the recognition of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
age remains surprising due to the modernity of the concept and its controversial nature. 
Unquestionably, the adoption of Directive 2000/78 itself is the expression of the unanimous 
willingness of the Member States to combat age discrimination.67 This assertion nevertheless 
requires a caveat. The intention of the authors of the Amsterdam Treaty not to create rights of 
general application is reflected in the precise wording of Article 13 EC, in particular when 
read in comparison with Article 12 EC. Moreover, if despite the wording of Article 13 EC, the 
Court is willing to upgrade the legal status of the right of non-discrimination contained therein, 
account could have been taken of the provisions of Article 18 Paragraph 2 of the Directive. 
Such provisions allowed for a three year extention of the transposition deadline for Member 
States meeting difficulties as regards specifically the implementation of the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of age and disability. It should be mentioned that this is precisely 
the derogation from which the Federal Republic of Germany benefited at the time of the 
facts.68 The reasoning in the Mangold ruling, rendered before the expiry of such a time 
extension, is in that respect remarkably poor.69  The third Recital of the Preamble of the 
                                                          
66 A.G. Lagrange in Case 14/61, Hoogovens v High Authority, Opinion of 4 June 1962, E.C.R. [1962] 277, 283-284.  
67 For a discussion of the implicit reference to Article II-81 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, see 
Schmidt, “The Principle of Non-discrimination in Respect of Age: Dimensions of the EC’s Mangold Judgement” 
(2006) Vol.7 N°5 German Law Journal 505, 519. 
68 On specific difficulties in Germany see Schmidt, supra fn.67, 510. 
69 Along similar lines see Editorial, E.L.Rev. supra fn.4, 2. 
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Directive, devoted to sex equality, is irrelevant to support the recognition of a principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age. As for the fourth Recital, it refers to a series of international 
instruments adopted between the end of the 1940s and the 1960s none of which explicitly 
mentions non-discrimination on grounds of age. Finally, the assertion according to which 
such a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age would derive from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States is not supported by evidence.  
The relationship entertained between the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
and the wider principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation70 raises 
a second series of questions. The impact the Mangold case may indeed have on future 
litigation could be seen as extremely broad if it could be assumed that all the grounds of 
discrimination covered in Directive 2000/78, including in particular sexual orientation, are now 
constitutive of a general principles of Community law. The ruling in Mangold echoes the 
obiter dictum of the Court in Grant71 whereby the Court, after stating that “Community law as 
it stands at present does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation”72, pointed at 
the new insertion of Article 13 EC to empower the Community legislator to intervene in that 
area.73 The mere enactment of Directive 2000/78 would thereby have met the ECJ’s call and 
the wording of the Mangold case suggests that the Court is ready to modify its approach to 
non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. The question of how far beyond the 
scope of Directive 2000/78 such a reasoning of the Court could be taken is also open. The 
present ruling not only refers to the general principle of equal treatment in the field of 
employment and occupation but it also mentions “the general principle of equal treatment, in 
particular in respect of age”74.  Shall the ruling therefore be restricted to directives 
establishing a “general framework” as stated in the title of Directive 2000/78 or could this 
extend to directives laying down “a framework” as indicated in Article 1 of Directive 2000/43 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin75? If one bears in mind that non-discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin are 
far less controversial rights than age or sexual orientation are76, it is likely that they could be 
upgraded to general principles of Community law in future rulings. Also, as the Editorialist of 
the Common Market Law Review puts it, if this logic was to be accepted, “[Chapter] IV of the 
                                                          
70 The Court disregards the suggestion of A.G. Tizzano (supra fn.18, [83] and [84]) to found the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age on the general principle of equal treatment and instead focuses on the principle of 
equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation. 
71 Case C-249/96, Grant v South West Trains Ltd [1998] E.C.R. I-621. 
72 ibid., [47]. The Court thereby refused to extend the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex so as to 
include non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
73 ibid., [48]. In a subsequent case, the Court sought to elude the question and also referred to the role of the 
legislator, Joined Case C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P, D and Kingdom of Sweden v Council of the European Union 
[2001] E.C.R. I-4319, [37]-[38]. For a more critical view of the relationship between Mangold and these cases see 
Editorial, E.L.Rev. supra fn.4, 2. 
74 At [ 76]. 
75 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,  [2000] O.J. L 180/22. 
76 Waddington and Bell, “More equal than others: distinguishing european union equality directives” (2001) 38 
Common Market Law Review 587, 588 and 610.  
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Charter of Fundamental Rights, grouping a wide range of social aspirations under the 
heading “Solidarity”, would provide a fertile source of such speculative claims”77. 
Both the very legitimacy of asserting the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of age and the relationship between the general principle of equal treatment and 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age may therefore be questioned. But the 
practical effect given to this new general principle of Community law is possibly even more far 
reaching. 
 
(ii) The unprecedented legal effects of a general principle of Community law  
As phrased by Advocate General Gulman, the question of “whether the Community law 
principles regarding the protection of fundamental rights may in some cases be relied on as 
creating obligations in proceedings between individuals and not just in proceedings between 
individuals and the authorities which are the primary addresses of fundamental rights” is a 
question “which is in fact of fundamental importance and of some difficulty”78. Indeed, as 
Tridimas puts it “Issues pertaining to the application of fundamental rights may arise in 
litigation between individuals. This is not to say, however, that fundamental rights are 
horizontally applicable. It can be said that a fundamental right produces horizontal effect only 
if it is accepted that it can be breached by the conduct of a private party”79. This nevertheless 
is precisely what the Court implies without an ounce of an explanation in the Mangold case.80  
Mr Mangold seeks to rely on EC law in order to assert his community right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of age against his employer. Even though it implies setting 
aside a provision of national law to the benefit of another provision of national law, such a 
mechanism amounts to granting horizontal direct effect to a substantive Community right. 
The same conclusion applies whether the Community right at stake derives from an 
unimplemented directive before the end of its transposition period or from a general principle 
of EC law. If the Mangold case sits uneasily with the case-law on the horizontal direct effect of 
directives, it also is novel from the point of view of the law on the general principles of 
Community law. The Court nevertheless ignores the issue and the Advocate General, who 
explicitly asserts that the general principle of equality can be relied upon in a private litigation, 
does not provide any authority for this statement.81 The ruling therefore raises the question of 
                                                          
77 Editorial, Common Market Law Review,  supra fn.52, 8. 
78 A.G. Gulmann in Case C-2/92, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Dennis Clifford 
Bostock, Opinion of 20 April 1993, [39] and in Case C-60/92, Otto BV v Postbank NV, Opinion of 15 June 1993, 
E.C.R. 1993 I-5693, [ 22]. 
79 Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (1st Edition, Oxford University Press, 1999), 31. 
80 Out of the three cases referred to by the ECJ in its reasoning, the Caballero case (Case C-442/00, Ángel 
Rodríguez Caballero v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa) [2002] E.C.R. I-11915) does indeed involve general 
principles of EC law as grounds of review of the act of a Member State but this appeared to be in a vertical litigation. 
As regards the two other cases referred to by the Court (Case C-347/96, Solred SA v Administración General del 
Estado [1998] E.C.R. I-937 and Case 106/77,  Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] 
E.C.R. 629), they do not relate to general principles of Community law.  Note, in the same direction, Editorial, 
Common Market Law Review  supra fn.52, 8. 
81 A.G. Tizzano,  supra fn.18, [84] and [101]. The cases referred to at [83] relate to vertical relationships and the case 
referred to at [101] to support the view that the general principles of Community law can be relied upon by an 
individual against the State is irrelevant. 
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the implications to draw for future litigation between private parties relying on a general 
principle of Community Law. This is particularly relevant regarding employment relationships 
and the future of the distinction drawn between private and public employers as regards the 
application of EC social directives as initiated in Marshall82. The potential impact of the ruling 
in Mangold however goes beyond the scope of social law. 
An interesting statement in that respect was rendered in the Piau case.83 The Court of First 
instance appears to question, in an obiter dictum, the compatibility of the rule-making power 
claimed by the FIFA in the light of the principles common to the Member States. The Court 
indeed inquires into whether a private organisation aimed at regulating the promotion of 
football but exercising regulatory powers beyond this scope would comply with the civil and 
economic liberties as guaranteed by Community law.84  Leaving aside the factual background 
of this case and fully acknowledging the limits of drawing a parallel between these two cases 
on their substance, it is surprising to observe that in both Mangold and Piau the Court 
blatantly disregards the fact that they imply the creation of duties on private entities. In Piau, 
the CFI seems to even suggest the application of the general principles against a private 
entity in the absence of any national legislation. It may be recalled that the Court has also 
been referring to the general principles of Community law in vertical litigations in areas where 
its own competence was most unclear. This can be seen from the Akrich85 case for instance. 
One could be tempted to analyse this case-law as the Court’s expression of its constitutional 
role in the EC via the protection of individuals against the State even in situations where 
Community law does not apply but also protecting individuals against stronger private actors 
such as employers or the FIFA. Even if these cases were the expression of such a noble 
mission, a lawyer’s mind would expect the Court to justify the legitimacy of this pre-emption of 
judicial competences. In Mangold, the Court could be seen to seek to justify its bold 
reasoning by stressing the importance of ensuring the respect for the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age “in particular so far as the organisation of appropriate legal 
remedies, the burden of proof, protection against victimisation, social dialogue, affirmative 
action and other specific measures to implement such a directive are concerned.”86 This 
paragraph is however most obscure in that it juxtaposes procedural rights with material rights.  
 
The solution adopted by the Court in Mangold is therefore surprising from the point of view of 
both the case-law on directives and on the general principles of Community law. In an 
attempt to clarify this ruling’s impact, a few points should be stressed. First, the Court 
heralded that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, despite being subject to 
                                                          
82 Case 152/84, M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] 
E.C.R. 723, [49]. 
83 Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission [2005] E.C.R. II-209. The author is grateful to P. Ibañez Colomo for 
bringing this to our attention and for the very valuable discussion that followed and inspired the following remark.  
84 ibid., [76]-[78]. 
85 Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hacene Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607, [54] and [58]. 
86 At [76]. 
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many discussions and to great care by the legislator, constitutes a general principle of 
Community law. Such a principle is a component of the general principle of equal treatment. 
The combination of both statements allows to expect a fruitful upcoming case-law on the 
basis of the 2000 Directives adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC. As regards the impact of 
this ruling on horizontal relationships however, we wish to submit that the case could be 
restrictively interpreted. Indeed, as a result of the complete ignorance of the horizontal nature 
of the dispute, the argument could be put forward that this particular aspect of the case is left 
for the national court to take into account. Mangold would therefore constitute a ruling on the 
interpretation of EC law in abstracto, detached from the factual background of the case. The 
law on the legal effects of directives and principles of Community law would therefore remain 
unaffected. The reason for seeking such a restrictive interpretation of the case does not only 
derive from the wish to reconcile it with previous case-law on the effects of EC law in national 
law, but also from the material scope of the ruling. As we shall now see, reliance on the 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age has indeed allowed the ECJ to 
comfort its jurisdiction over national employment policies in a most undue manner.  
 
 ECJ comforting its jurisdiction over national employment policies 
The ruling in Mangold provides the Court with an opportunity to consider Directive 2000/78 
for the first time and in particular its provisions on non-discrimination on grounds of age. 
Faced with a directly discriminatory national measure, the Court inquires into the possibility of 
justifying the discrimination (a) before analysing the proportionality of the measure (b). 
 
(a) The unquestionable legitimacy of support to older workers’ participation in the labour force 
The provision of national law at stake in Mangold is aimed at the vocational integration of 
unemployed aged workers. The Court was therefore called upon to scrutinize modern 
employment policy concerns derived from the ageing of the European workforce in the light of 
the non-discrimination principle. Before analysing the novelty of the legitimate aim recognised 
by the Court, we ought to focus on the structure of the Court’s analysis of the justification 
relating to the directly discriminatory measure. 
 
(i) An objective justification for direct discrimination  
It should be briefly mentioned that the theoretical scheme of analysis of the principle of equal 
treatment allows for direct discrimination to be derogated from by way of express 
derogations. Indirect discrimination by contrast, can be justified by objective reasons 
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unrelated to the prohibited ground of discrimination. 87 The latter analysis is an integral part of 
the scrutiny of the discriminatory nature of the measure.88 The practical impact of this 
distinction is that while direct discrimination is in principle unlawful and can only be derogated 
from in expressly circumscribed circumstances, indirect discrimination may more easily be 
justified.  
By contrast with this common scheme of analysis, the text of Directive 2000/78 merely 
stresses that “differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified”89 and that 
“Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination”90. Indeed, such differences of treatment can be “objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim”91 for which the list is open ended.  If this is the case, 
and if the national measure is appropriate and necessary, then both the Preamble of 
Directive 2000/7892 and its Article 6(1) indicate that the difference of treatment shall not 
constitute discrimination. The wording of Directive 2000/78 therefore suggests that any type 
of discrimination on grounds of age can be objectively justified.  This is confirmed by the 
given ruling. Mr Mangold is indeed unquestionably victim of direct discrimination93 and the 
Court, following the structure of the Directive, accepts that the measure may be justified by a 
legitimate public-interest objective.    
This peculiar mechanism could be understood as resulting from a compromise between the 
Member States’ modern concern to tackle age discrimination on the one hand and the 
remaining importance of age related distinctions in social and employment policies. Direct 
discrimination to favour older workers can be seen as a form of positive discrimination. In this 
context, the provisions of Directive 2000/78 related to the possibility to justify direct 
discrimination through objective reasons, could be better understood. It remains to be seen 
however how this can fit with the EC law on non-discrimination that has never until now 
tackled positive discrimination in such a way.  
The great care that Member States have taken in both the drafting of Article 13 EC and the 
provisions of the Directive specifically related to age discrimination indicate their willingness 
to have an important margin of discretion recognised when dealing with age discrimination. A 
particular dimension is given to this atypical mechanism by the Mangold ruling. By elevating 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age to a component of the general principle 
                                                          
87 For examples on sex discrimination see e.g. Case  C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte 
Nicole Seymour-Smith and Laura Perez [1999] E.C.R. I-623, [67]; Case 171/88, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-
Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG. [1989] E.C.R. 2743,  [12]; Case C-77/02, Erika Steinicke and Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit [2003] E.C.R. I-9027, [57].  
88 See e.g. A.G. Jacobs in Case  C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v  Land Hessen, Opinion of 6 July 2000, [34]-[35] and 
Editorial, E.L.Rev. supra fn.4, 2. 
89 Recital 25, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
90 Art. 6(1), Directive 2000/78. 
91 Art. 6(1), Directive 2000/78. The wording in Recital 25, Preamble, Directive 2000/78 is similar. 
92 Recital 25, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
93 At [57], see also A.G. Tizzano, supra fn.18, [88]. 
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of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, the Court triggers the concern 
that, as Arnull puts it, “whatever Council legislation may say, direct discrimination on any of 
the grounds mentioned in Art. 13 EC may be objectively justified”94. The same question is 
raised to an even greater extent as regards the impact of the Mangold ruling on the general 
principle of equal treatment and, for instance, discrimination on grounds of nationality. One 
could argue that the Court distinguishes between the substance of the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age, which as we have just seen is particularly flexible, and the 
effects of the prohibition of non-discrimination that are treated in two different stages of the 
reasoning of the Court. Reconciling the two is however admittedly difficult.  
 
(ii) A new legitimate employment policy objective  
As follows from the open wording of Article 6(1) of the Directive, the Court in Mangold is keen 
on accepting a new legitimate employment policy objectives. The novelty of such an objective 
can be seen by comparison with earlier case-law. Prior to Mangold, the Court had been faced 
with several cases involving age discrimination tackled indirectly via the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of sex. A good example for our analysis is Steinicke95 where the 
national provision at stake sought to promote part-time work for civil servants above 55 years 
old. The Bundesanstalt für Arbeit  argued that the “scheme is intended to […] make a 
contribution both to employment policy and to freeing posts in the employment market. The 
objective pursued by the system of part-time work for older employees is to encourage full-
time workers to be willing to accept reduced working hours.”96 Because the scheme under 
scrutiny excluded part-time workers from the benefit, it indirectly discriminated against female 
workers and therefore fell within the scope of Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of Directive 76/207.97 The 
Court however accepted, as on many occasions before98, that “encouragement of recruitment 
constitutes a legitimate aim of social policy”99 and reminds us that “the Member States have a 
broad margin of discretion in exercising that power”100 . This case is useful for our analysis in 
two respects. 
First, it illustrates the traditional position of national employment policies concerned with 
unblocking the labour market. In Mangold by contrast, the employment policy goal pursued is 
to make it more attractive for employers to hire older workers. The Court is very keen101 to 
                                                          
94 Editorial, E.L.Rev. supra fn.4, 2. 
95 Case C-77/02, Steinicke, supra fn.87. See also Case C-187/00, Helga Kutz-Bauer and Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg [2003] E.C.R. I-2741. 
96 ibid., [36].  
97 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, [1976] O.J. 
L 39/40, ibid, [57]. 
98 See e.g. Case C-187/00, Helga Kutz-Bauer, supra fn.95, [56]. 
99 Case C-77/02, Steinicke, supra fn.87, [62]. 
100 ibid, [61]. 
101 At [60]. 
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accept such a change in national employment policy objectives and asserts that the 
promotion of the vocational integration of unemployed older workers constitutes, “as a rule”, a 
legitimate objective.102 One ought in that respect to recall the substance of Recitals 8 and 25 
of Directive 2000/78. The Community legislature refers to the consensus on new directions 
for national employment policies as results from the EES by recalling the substance of the 
Employment Guidelines for 2000. The approach suggested by the EES includes a special 
concern for older workers, in other words, “the need to pay particular attention to supporting 
older workers, in order to increase their participation in the labour force”103 and the 
awareness that “[t]he prohibition of age discrimination is an essential part of meeting the aims 
set out in the Employment Guidelines and encouraging diversity in the workforce”104. The 
ruling in Mangold therefore crystallizes the encounter between EC policy making and legal 
mechanisms, thereby comforting Hatzopoulos suggestion that there exist a form of dialogue 
between Lisbon and Luxemburg.105  
Second, in Steinicke as in Mangold106,  the Court was happy to allow Member States a broad 
margin of discretion in exercising their employment policy powers. Such a prima facie self-
restraint is justified by the current delineation of competences between Member States and 
the EC as regards social and employment policy. Title VIII of the ECT, devoted to 
“Employment”, provides that the Member States and the Community shall “work towards 
developing a coordinated strategy for employment”107. As Advocate General Geelhoed puts 
it, “it is clear that competence in establishing employment […] policy rests primarily with 
Member States, while the Community plays a coordinating and complementary role. »108  It 
could have been concluded from this, combined with the flexible wording of Article 13 EC and 
the Directive itself, that the Court would indeed allow the Member States an important leeway 
in exercising employment policy choices. As can be seen from the Court’s analysis of the 
proportionality of Paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG, this has however not been the case.  
 
(b) Counterbalancing modern employment policy choices with Human rights 
 
After having asserted the unquestionable legitimacy of the promotion of the employment of 
older workers and having pointed to the broad margin of discretion of the Member States in 
                                                          
102 See in particular [59]-[61]. It can be observed that A.G. Tizzano (supra fn.18, [89] and [90])  does not even discuss 
the legitimacy of the objective pursued. 
103 Recital 8, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
104 Recital 25, Preamble, Directive 2000/78. 
105 See in particular Hatzopoulos, “A (more) social Europe: a political crossroad or a legal one-way? Dialogues 
between Lisbon and Luxembourg” (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1599. 
106 At [63]. 
107 Art. 125 EC. 
108 A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-406/04, Gérald De Cuyper v Office national de l'emploi, Opinion of 2 February 2006,  
[72]. See also, along the same lines, A.G. Geelhoed in the second case on Directive 2000/78 still pending Case C-
13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA, Opinion of 16 March 2006, [52] et seq. 
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their employment policy choices, the Court operates a fairly strict scrutiny of the 
proportionality of the measure.  
 
(i) Human rights v. national employment policy  
In Mangold, the Court strikes down the national measure at the stage of the analysis of the 
measure’s proportionality. 109 In Mangold, the Court concentrates on the necessity of the 
measure. It first inquires into the automatic nature of the provision that applies to “all workers 
who have reached the age of 52, without distinction, whether or not they were unemployed 
before the contract was concluded and whatever the duration of any period of 
unemployment”110. It then focuses on the impact the measure may have on each of them who 
can “be offered fixed-term contracts of employment which may be renewed an indefinite 
number of times”111, therefore  threatening that “a substantial part of [the members of this 
group of workers’] working life, of being excluded from the benefit of stable employment”112.  
Such a supervision of national policy choices seeks to ensure on the one hand, that the 
national measures are economically suitable for the aim pursued as can be seen from the 
Court’s insistence, in particular, that “other consideration linked to the structure of the labour 
market”113 are be taken into account.114  On the other hand, the Court pushes its human 
rights jurisdiction further. First of all, non-discrimination on grounds of age, as stated by the 
Court later on in the ruling, constitutes a general principle of Community law. But because of 
the very nature of the objective of the national employment policy that, per se, requires a 
difference of treatment on grounds of age, the Court brings into the proportionality test an 
external element: the notion of stable relationship. The Court is eager to accept that stable 
employment constitutes a major element of the protection of workers that weighs in favour of 
the unlawfulness of the national provision. Such a reasoning is not without echoing the case-
law in which the Court of Justice, besides weighing the two interests in presence, imports a 
third interest such as a fundamental right in the balancing exercise.115 The precise legal 
nature of the notion of stable employment in the given case is however not defined. Such 
uncertainty results from the difficulty of assessing the proportionality of a directly 
discriminatory measure at the light of an inherently discriminatory justification.  
The Court therefore is unquestionably seeking to strike the correct balance between the 
protection of individuals’ rights and Member States’ employment policy choices. Several 
arguments could be made in support of this view. Direct discrimination per se calls for a strict 
                                                          
109 At [63].  
110 At [64]. 
111 At [64]. 
112 At [64]. 
113 At [65]. 
114 The Court in Steinicke (Case C-77/02, Steinicke, supra fn.87, [65]) controls the economic suitability of the 
measure. 
115 See e.g. Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others E.C.R. [1991] I-2925,  
[43]. 
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scrutiny of the Court. Also, as we have pointed out by referring to the Steinicke case, age 
discrimination may also be constitutive of indirect sex discrimination. The risk of 
inconsistencies in case-law in the event of “multiple discrimination”116, could have justified the 
application of a strong proportionality test. Finally, it shall be mentioned, that in the current 
state of economic integration, employment constitutes the main variable d’ajustement 
economique since Member States have very strict criteria to fulfil in other areas of their 
economies, in particular regarding the Growth and Stability Pact117. The human rights 
concern of the Court would in that sense prevent national employment policies, coordinated 
in the EES, to be used as an economic instrument irrespective of individual’s rights. The 
legitimacy of the Court’s intervention in this context, together with the economic impact of the 
Court’s ruling are however questionable.  
 
(ii) The ECJ and national employment policies 
In the field of employment policy, competence lies primarily with the Member States.  
Moreover, as specified by Article 13(1) EC, measures to tackle discrimination are to be taken 
“[w]ithout prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers 
conferred by it”. The degree of scrutiny of the Court should therefore be analysed in the light 
of the weak Community competence in this area.118 If it cannot be denied that Directive 
2000/78 precisely establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, the wording of Article 13 EC, the Preamble of the Directive and the provisions 
related to age discrimination point to the Member States’ concern that they be granted a 
broad margin of discretion.  One could therefore be surprised to see the Court 
counterbalancing national employment policy choices with the concern that an individual 
enjoy a stable employment relationship. It is in particular in circumventing the extension of the 
implementation period for the directive, with recourse to the general principle, that the Court 
puts an undue regulatory and inevitable economic constraint upon the national legislator. The 
risk for the Court to engage in such a direction is to contribute to an overregulation of the 
labour market in a period of time in which the Member States have agreed to give it more 
flexibility within the framework of the EES. This observation shall further be read in the light of 
the horizontal nature of the litigation between Mr. Mangold and Mr. Helm.  
What is indeed unprecedented is that the  Mangold ruling suggests that the ECJ will accept to 
review national employment policy measures relied upon in litigation between private parties, 
therefore possibly creating obligations for private employers. In other words, the Court does 
not only, in substance, state that a provision of national law justified by a legitimate 
                                                          
116 Sheik, « A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law ? » (2002) 8 European Law Journal 290, 
311. 
117 Trubek and Trubek in particular point out that the EES emerged out of the “constraint” created by monetary 
integration and the Growth and Stability pact (Trubek and Trubek, “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social 
Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination” (2002) 11/3 European Law Journal 345). On the link between 
the EURO and the EES, see Mortelmans, « The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, what’s 
in a market?” (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 101. 
118 Along the same lines, A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-13/05, supra fn.108, [55]. 
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employment policy objective is disproportionate to its aim in that a substantial category of 
older workers will be deprived from a stable employment relationship. It also seems to imply 
that this will result in the corresponding provision in a contract of employment being devoid of 
its effects. If this is so, Mr Helm, the employer of Mr Mangold, is left with the duty not to 
discriminate on grounds of age and to ensure that older employees are not deprived of a 
stable employment relationship in a disproportionate manner. The economic weight the 
principle of non-discrimination is likely to have on private employers ought not to be 
disregarded. 119 This is likely to have contrary effect to what Member States have been trying 
to achieve within the EES and the legitimacy of the Court’s intrusion based on grounds of 
discrimination which have just freshly been enacted and are still causing difficulties within 
some Member States is in that respect highly questionable.  
 
Conclusion 
Both from a legal and an economic perspective, one could accordingly fear that Article 13 EC 
and the secondary legislation adopted therein constitute, «à l’instar du défi d’Archimède, un 
point d’appui universel à partir duquel les principes de non-discrimination définis à l’article 13 
CE peuvent être utilisés pour corriger, sans l’intervention des pères du traité ou du législateur 
communautaire, les arbitrages faits par les États membres dans l’exercice des compétences 
qui leur restent – encore – »120. An argument could therefore be made in favour of a 
restrictive interpretation of certain aspects of the Mangold case. In that respect, it shall be 
stressed that is likely that both Directive 2000/78 and Directive 2000/43 will trigger a 
fascinating body of case-law on the general principles. The modalities of their application to 
modern employment and social policy choices, will however have to be clarified by the 
Community judiciary. Regarding the horizontal affect of such principles, as submitted earlier 
the Court having blatantly disregarded the horizontal nature of the dispute, the ruling could 
possibly be presumed to have been given in abstracto.  
As illustrated in another pending case, De Cuyper121, Article 13 EC is far from being the only 
meeting point of national employment policies and the ECJ’s concern for individual’s rights. 
Other instruments of labour market regulation such as unemployment benefits should be seen 
in the evolving context of the relationship between Community law and national policy making 
as regards labour market.122 We can only hope that the Court will strike the right balance 
between legal certainty, respect for national policy choices and the protection of individuals. 
 
 
                                                          
119 See in particular A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-13/05, supra fn.108, [50] and [51]. 
120 A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-13/05, supra fn.108, [54] (at the time of writing, the text is not available in English).  
121 A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-406/04, supra fn.108, in particular at [60], see also [61]-[63]. 
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